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A POSTERIORI STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION:
THE PRESERVATION OF STEREOTYPES
THROUGH MEMORY DISTORTION
AD VAN KNIPPENBERC. AND AP DIJKSTERHUIS
University of Nijmegen
Four experiments investigated memory for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent information after a posteriori stereotype activation. In Experiment 1 it
was established that, in comparison with a no stereotype control condition, recall
of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors of group members deteriorated after a poste
riori stereotype activation, while recall of stereotype-consistent information was
not affected. An explanation of this phenomenon in terms of the memory organi
zation of behaviors in trait-behavior clusters was tested in Experiment 2. The results
of Experiment 2 suggest that recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors suffered
from a stereotype activated afterwards when they were stored in a separate trait
(i.e., not linked to stereotype-consistent behaviors), while stereotype-inconsistent
information that was linked to stereotype-consistent information did not. In Experi
ment 3 the same pattern of results was obtained when an a posteriori stereotype
was activated using an "unrelated prime" (i.e., the stereotype did not pertain to
information presented earlier), suggesting the operation of involuntary, uncon
scious processes in deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent information.
Finally, the results of Experiment 4 provide evidence for the idea that the impaired
recall of stereotype-inconsistent information may be, at least partly, ascribed to
suppressed access to stereotype-inconsistent traits due to a posteriori stereotype
activation.
In the literature on stereotype activation and memory, relatively little
attention has been paid to the influence of an activated stereotype on
recall of earlier encoded information. In their well-known "Betty K
study," Snyder and Uranowitz (1978) suggested that a stereotype pre
sented after encoding elicits a subjective "reconstruction" of initially
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encoded information. They reported superior recognition of "heterosex
ual" information under conditions in which Betty K was said to be
heterosexual compared to conditions in which Betty K was said to be a
lesbian. Clark and Woll (1981), however, found no such consistency
advantage in similar experiments.
Rothbart, Evans, and Fulero (1979) and Cohen (1981) also studied the
effects of a posteriori stereotype activation. The recall data of Rothbart et
al. (1979) revealed no significant difference between memory for ex
pected and unexpected behaviors; however, their unexpected behaviors
cannot simply be regarded as inconsistent. In Cohen's (1981) study,
subjects watched a videotape in which a woman performed stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Under conditions in
which the stereotype was activated after the subjects watched the vide
otape, subjects were able to recognize more stereotype-consistent behav
iors than stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Similar findings were
reported in a number of other studies in which both recognition and free
recall paradigms were used (Hirt, Erickson, & McDonald, 1993;
Pyszczynski, LaPrelle, & Greenberg, 1987; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull,
1984; Wyer & Martin, 1986; see also Belezza & Bower, 1981; Clark & Woll,
1981 ; for a review, see Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992).
HOW DOES AN A POSTERIORI STEREOTYPE
AEFECT MEMORY?
The general picture that emerges from the studies previously cited is
that, compared to prior stereotype activation, the activation of an (7
posteriori stereotype impedes recall of stereotype-inconsistent informa
tion, while recall of stereotype-consistent information is not affected.
However, the processes underlying a posteriori stereotype effects on
recall do not seem to be well understood.
Pyszczynski et al. (1987) suggested that an a posteriori activated stereo
type might function as a retrieval cue (for a similar argument, see Srull &
Wyer, 1989; Wyer, Bodenhausen, & Srull, 1984). The postulated retrieval
cue mechanism may operate as follows: An a posteriori activated stereo
type elicits a memory search guided by stereotypical expectations. This
would lead the search in stereotype-consistent directions, while at the
same time this expectancy-guided search would misdirect or distract the
search away from stereotype-inconsistent information, reducing the
chance of recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Since this predic
tion was sustained, the retrieval cue explanation seems to be corrobo
rated.
On closer examination, however, some questions arise which cannot
be answered within Pyszczynski et al.'s experimental design. As argued
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by Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1995a), the comparison between
a priori and a posteriori stereotype activation may be more indicative of
encoding than of retrieval effects. Assuming that a priori stereotype
activation affects both encoding (i.e., the on-line processing and storage
of information in memory) and retrieval (assuming that during the free
recall task the stereotype was still activated), while stereotype activation
a fterwards only affects retrieval, the contrast between the two conditions
suggests differential encoding effects, and not differential retrieval. In
other words, the better recall of stereotype-inconsistent information in
the prior activation condition, compared to the stereotype-afterwards
condition, most likelv reflects an encoding advantage of stereotype-in
consistent information due to prior stereotype activation (see Rojahn &
Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Hence, to what extent a
posteriori activated stereotypes serve as retrieval cues is still unknown.
Pure retrieval cue effects of a posteriori activated stereotypes may be
revealed when one compares the effects on memory of a stereotype
activated after subjects have been presented with behavioral information
with a condition in which the same behavioral information is presented
without mentioning the stereotype at all (i.e., a no stereotype control
condition). In such a comparison there would be no encoding difference
(because the two conditions are identical at this stage), and only the
retrieval circumstances would vary.
Recently, Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1995a) reported an ex
periment in which, using a recognition paradigm, an a posteriori stereo
type condition was compared with a no stereotype control condition.
Subjects were provided with behavioral information about two social
groups. Under conditions in which the groups were labelled (as environ
mental activists or professional soldiers) after encoding, recognition of
stereotype-consistent information was superior to recognition of stereo
type-inconsistent information. The comparison of the a posteriori stereo
type activation condition with the no stereotype control condition
showed a recognition decrease of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due
to afterwards stereotype activation, and no effect at all on the stereotype-
consistent behaviors.
Although Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1995a) avoided encod
ing differences between conditions, the fact that they used a recognition
paradigm (a paradigm in which earlier presented behaviors had to be
allocated to one of two groups), renders their study somewhat inconclu
sive as regards the retrieval cue function of a posteriori stereotypes. Active
memory search is probably more crucial in free recall than in recognition
(although retrieval processes may operate in recognition, see, e.g., Man-
dler, 1980). Furthermore, as argued by Belezza and Bower (1981; see also
Stangor & McMillan, 1992), recognition paradigms (or, as in this case,
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"allocation paradigms") may be subject to guessing biases. That is, if
subjects have to allocate a behavior to a group (or to one of two groups),
they may not really remember whether or not they have seen it as being
associated with that group, but rely on stereotype-inconsistency in their
decision not to allocate.
Considering the weaknesses of this study with regard to under
standing the effects of a posteriori stereotypes on retrieval, a free recall
paradigm would be a more appropriate method. Furthermore, as we
intend to present a theoretical explanation for the deteriorated recall
phenomenon, it seems worthwhile to demonstrate its strengths. There
fore, in Experiment 1 we replicate Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg's
(1 995a) design while using a free recall task to assessmemory. The results
of this study show that recall of stereotype-inconsistent behavior dete
riorated due to a posteriori stereotype activation, while recall of stereo
type-consistent behaviors remained unaffected, which replicates earlier
findings. In sum, it seems that the a posteriori activated stereotype some
how deflects the memory search away from earlier encoded stereotype-
inconsistent information. The question is, how?
In order to account for the observed impeded recall of stereotype-in
consistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation, we have
further elaborated on the idea that stereotypes may serve as retrieval
cues. The basic tenet of the proposed "guided search" or "guided re
trieval" explanation is that traits attributed to a group (or person) guide
thememory search in the direction of trait-related behavior. An activated
stereotype may lead the search in the direction of some (i.e., stereotype-
consistent) traits and distract the search away from other (i.e., stereotype-
inconsistent) traits. As our approach entails assumptions concerning the
organization of behavioral information in memory, we will first expand
on the presumed trait-behavior clustering in encoding and storage of
social information, and subsequently elaborate on how this memory
organization may affect retrieval.
THE ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIORAL INFORMATION
IN MEMORY
Traits play a major role in social perception. Upon observing the behav
iors of others, we may often, when trying to make sense of these behav
iors, encode them in terms of underlying traits (see e.g., Gilbert &
Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). In fact, upon perceiving
overt behavior we mav infer the underlying trait spontaneously and
unconsciously (Carlston & Skowronski, 1995; Newman & Uleman, 1989;
Uleman, 1987; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff,
1985).
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If trait implications may be spontaneously invoked during encoding,
it is conceivable that traits also play a role in the storage of information
in memory. The person memory literature indeed suggests that traits are
used to organize behavioral information in memory. When people are
forming impressions, behavioral information may be clustered in mem
ory with the help of trait dimensions (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Knippen
berg, in press-a; Driscoll, 1992; Gordon & Wyer, 1987; Hamilton, Driscoll,
& Worth, 1989; Hastie, 1980; Srull & Wyer, 1989; Wyer, Bodenhausen, &
Srull, 1984). For example, behaviors such as "he kicked the cat" and "he
wrecked a telephone booth" may be stored together under the trait
concept "aggressive." Other behaviors, for instance "he recited a sonnet
of Shakespeare by heart" and "he explained quantum theory to his
girlfriend" may be stored under another trait concept like "intelligent."
Theoretically, such behavior-trait clusterings may be understood as
groupings in memory of behavioral items having between-item associa
tions as well as item-trait associations which may facilitate subsequent
recall of the clustered items (e.g., Gordon & Wyer, 1987; Hamilton, Katz,
& Leirer, 1980, Srull, 1983).
THE ROLE OF TRAITS AND STEREOTYPES IN GUIDED
RETRIEVAL
Imagine that you observe behaviors displayed by members of a group
(or by a person). Some of these behaviors imply intelligence, while others
imply aggressiveness. As suggested above, these behaviors are presum
ably stored separately in two different trait-behavior clusters. A sche
matic model of the assumed underlying representation is depicted in
Figure 1 ("before stereotype activation").
A guided retrieval conception of recall of behavioral information
would suggest that, when no stereotype is activated at all (i.e., in a no
stereotype control condition), the memory search is guided by the sub
ject's knowledge that the stimulus group (or person) is both intelligent
and aggressive,1 as a consequence of which the subject may actively try
to retrieve instances of intelligent and aggressive behaviors from mem
ory. The solid lines in Figure 1 ("before stereotype activation") indicate
the routes through which the search process would evolve. In this
situation the probability of retrieval would be equal for the two types of
behaviors.
However, if a stereotype is activated after the information is encoded,
1. For the sake of simplicity, guided retrieval is depicted here as a conscious process.
However, as will be explained later, evidence suggests that unconscious processes are
involved.
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of which (in)consistency is not yet defined. Solid lines indicate high probabilities of retrieving informa
tion, while dotted lines indicate low probabilities. For simplicity, inter-behavior associations are
neglected.
FIGURE 1. Schematic representation under two trait-conditions before (left) and after
(right) stereotype activation.
a different process may occur. Suppose the subject learns that the behav
iors were all performed by college professors. As a consequence, some
behaviors become stereotype-consistent (the intelligent ones) and some
others become stereotype-inconsistent (the aggressive ones). In this situ
ation, a guided search approach assumes that the activated stereotype
affects the mental representation of the stimulus group (or person) in the
sense that, in the present example, the association with the trait intelli
gent would be strengthened, while the association with the trait aggres
sive may be weakened. To the extent, then, that the stereotype guides
retrieval, the search would preferentially be directed towards retrieving
instances of intelligent behavior, while it would misdirect the search
away from the stereotype-inconsistent behaviors, reducing the prob
ability of recall of the latter. Figure 1 ("after stereotype activation")
schematically depicts the search avenues in the case of a posteriori stereo
type activation.
It is worth noting at this stage that the preferential search for stereo
type-consistent behaviors need not lead to their enhanced recall com
pared to the control condition because, as we argued above, in the control
condition the memory search would be trait-guided as well. Hence, the
guided retrieval explanation would account for the reduced recall of
stereotype-inconsistent information due to a posteriori stereotype activa-
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Note. Cs represent consistent behaviors, Is represent inconsistent behaviors and Bs represent behaviors
of which (in)consistencv is not yet defined. Again, inter-behavior associations are neglected in these
figures.
FIGURE 2. Schematic model of the representation in memory under one-trait condition
before (left) and after (right) stereotype activation.
tion, as well as for the absence of an effect on stereotype-consistent
information.
This explanation in terms of trait-guided retrieval implies that recall
of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors suffers from a posteriori stereotype
activation only if these stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are stored
under a different trait concept than the stereotype-consistent ones. If
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors are stored
under the same (stereotype-consistent) trait, a posteriori stereotype acti
vation is not expected to lead to reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent
information. Some recent research not only shows that behaviors are
clustered in memory in terms of traits, but also that behaviors having
opposite implications for the same trait dimension (e.g., intelligent and
stupid behaviors) are stored under the same trait-behavior cluster
(Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in press-a; Hamilton, Driscoll, &
Worth, 1989). In this situation stereotype-consistent and stereotype-in
consistent behaviors would become associated with the same stereo
type-consistent trait (e.g., intelligence) and presumably
consistent-inconsistent inter-behavior associations would be formed as
well. One may therefore expect that, in this case, stereotype-consistent
and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors will be recalled equallywell in the
no stereotype control condition (see Figure 2; "before stereotype activa-
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Hon") and in the a posteriori stereotype condition (see Figure 2; "after
stereotype activation").
Hence, on the basis of a guided retrieval model, we predict that
deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori
stereotype activation only occurs when stereotype-consistent and stereo
type-inconsistent behaviors bear on different trait concepts (e.g., intelli
gent and aggressive), and not when they pertain to the same
stereotype-consistent trait (e.g., intelligent). This prediction is tested in
Experiment 2. In agreement with our present argument, the results show
that, compared to a no stereotype control condition, recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors suffers from a posteriori stereotype activation only
when they bear on a different trait than the stereotype-consistent behav
iors, while there is no deteriorated recall when they load on the same
trait dimension. Furthermore, clustering data seem to corroborate the
presumed underlying memory organization in terms of the same versus
separate traits.
COGNITIVE PROCESSES OPERATING IN GUIDED RETRIEVAL
As regards the precise nature of the guided search process, some perti
nent questions remain. Is guided retrieval a conscious and deliberate
search strategy? A conscious search strategy would require the subjects
to be aware of the fact that what they are asked to recall either pertains
to an intelligent and aggressive group (that is, in the control condition),
or to a group of professors (in the a posteriori stereotype condition) to
whom they attribute the trait intelligent (and not the trait aggressive).
For the strategy to be deliberate, subjects should intentionally try to
retrieve trait-related behaviors. That is, their memory search might be
characterized by voluntary contemplations, for instance, "So this was a
group of professors. Let me think, which intelligent behaviors did I see?"
In such an intentional search strategy, subjects might even disregard
retrieved stereotype-inconsistent behaviors deeming them inappropri
ate or unlikely to be true considering the nature of the stimulus group.
Conversely, the influence of the stereotype on recall may be uninten
tional and unconscious. Even without the subject's voluntary control or
awareness of the nature of the search process, the activation of the
professor stereotype may simply activate the trait intelligent, or enhance
its accessibility, as a result of which the stored intelligence-related be
haviors come to mind more easily than aggression-related behaviors.
Experiment 3 was designed to see whether deteriorated recall of stereo
type-inconsistent behaviors would still be observed when the a posteriori
stereotype activation was brought about bv an "unrelated prime" a
task in which, prior to the recall task, subjects were asked (allegedly to
THE PRESERVATION OF STEREOTYPES 29
help out a colleague of the experimenter) to think about a typical profes
sor and to write down attributes of his or her lifestyle and appearance.
The results of Experiment 3 showed deteriorated recall of stereotype-in
consistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation, again only
when it was stored in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait. Thus, even
when the activated stereotype does not pertain to the stimulus group, it
leads to reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information stored in
a separate trait-behavior cluster (as indicated by the clustering data).
These results suggest that the influence of an a posteriori activated stereo
type on recall is unintentional and unconscious.
THE ROLE OF FACILITATED AND INHIBITED ACCESS
There is one final issue that needs further clarification. How exactly does
a stereotype guide memory search? One mechanism already suggested
in our argument so far is that stereotype-consistent traits are activated,
or become more accessible, by the mere suggestion of the stereotype. For
instance, the label "professor" may trigger the activation of the trait
concept intelligent (as it may also trigger other, less flattering, traits). As
a result of the activation of the trait intelligent, subjectsmay unintention
ally search for instances of intelligence-related behaviors. This very
pre-occupation with intelligence-related behaviors may reduce the
chance of retrieving examples of aggressive behaviors from memory.
However, it is conceivable that stereotype activation also suppresses
access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. If one primes "professor," it may
be more difficult to think of the trait aggressive and, consequently, of
aggressive behaviors. Such inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent
traits may contribute to the phenomenon of deteriorated recall of stereo
type-inconsistent behaviors.
There is some evidence that stereotype activation not only facilitates
access to stereotype-consistent traits (cf. e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio,
Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994), but also inhibits
access to stereotype-inconsistent traits (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
in press-b). In two different paradigms (i.e., lexical decisions and solving
word puzzles), Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (in press-b) compared
the recognition of trait words by stereotype-primed and nonstereotype-
primed subjects. The traits to be recognized were either stereotype-con
sistent, stereotype-neutral or stereotype-inconsistent. The results
showed both enhanced (i.e., faster or better) recognition of stereotype-
consistent traits and reduced (i.e., slower or worse) recognition of stereo
type-inconsistent traits due to stereotype activation (both compared to
the irrelevant-prime control condition and compared to the stereotype-
neutral traits). These results were interpreted as indicative of facilitated
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access to stereotype-consistent traits and inhibited access to stereotype-
inconsistent traits as a result of stereotype activation. As the enhance
ment and suppression effects were virtually of the same magnitude, it
seems plausible that both mechanisms play an important role in stereo
typing (see Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991, for a related argument in the
language comprehension domain).
To recap, it is conceivable that the mere pre-occupation with the
stereotype-consistent trait prevented subjects from searching for stereo
type-inconsistent behaviors stored in a separate trait-behavior cluster.
The activation of the professor stereotype may have incited subjects to
look for intelligent behaviors, they remember some, and try again. As
long as the subjects retrieved some stereotype-consistent behaviors, they
may simply have persisted in pursuing search within the domain of
intelligence-related behaviors, thereby reducing the chance of recalling
behaviors related to stereotype-inconsistent traits "by default." In such
an interpretation of the guided search process, there is no need to assume
that inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent traits plays any role at all
in the observed impeded recall.
In our view, such a persistent search in a stereotype-consistent domain
is less likely to occur if there are no stereotype-consistent behaviors to
retrieve or, more precisely, if at the initial encoding stage the group (or
person) was not associated with any stereotype-consistent trait to begin
with. When there are no stereotype-consistent behaviors in the stimulus
material, search via stereotype-consistent traits would result in drawing
blanks. One would expect subjects, then, to abandon this type of search
and to try stereotype-inconsistent traits for a change, unless the a poste
riori activated stereotype hampers access to stereotype-inconsistent
traits.
Experiment 4 tries to elucidate the role of suppressed access to stereo
type-inconsistent traits in guided retrieval by presenting stereotype-in
consistent and stereotype-neutral behaviors only. The results of
Experiment 4 show impeded recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors
due to a posteriori stereotype activation (both compared to the no stereo
type control condition and compared to recall of the stereotype-neutral
behaviors) to occur even in the absence of stereotype-consistent behav
iors. Therefore, it seems plausible that, next to facilitated access to
stereotype-consistent traits, inhibited access to stereotype-inconsistent
traits also plays a role in stereotype-guided memory search.
EXPERIMENT 1
The robustness of impaired retrieval of stereotype-inconsistent informa
tion from memory due to a posteriori activated stereotypes is determined,
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by replicating the basic findings of our earlier study (Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg, 1995a) with a free recall measure. We compare recall of
stereotype-inconsistent information under conditions in which a stereo
type is activated after encoding with recall of stereotype-consistent
information under the same conditions and, more importantly, we also
compare recall of stereotype-inconsistent information after posterior
stereotype activation with recall of the same information in a no stereo
type control condition.
Wyer and Srull (1989) suggest that there is little reason to assume
different processes underlie person perception and group perception, as
long as the target group is a cohesive one that is, a group that is bound
by common aims and norms of behavior (see also Rojahn & Pettigrew,
1992; but see Stern, Marrs, Millar, & Cole, 1984; Wyer, Bodenhausen, &
Srull, 1984). In the context of a test of the robustness of the effect, and
because in most relevant studies stereotypes are activated before encod
ing, we study a target person as well a target group for exploratory
purposes.
METHOD
Subjects and Design. Seventy-one undergraduate students from the
University of Nijmegen participated in the study, receiving Dfl. 5 (ap
proximately 3 US Dollars) in return. Subjects were randomly assigned
to the cells of a 2 (stereotype activation: no stereotype activation vs
stereotype activation after encoding) x 2 (target: group vs. individual)
between-subjects design. Type of behavior (stereotype-consistent vs.
stereotype-inconsistent) constituted the within-subjects factor.
Pretesting ofStimulusMaterials. In an initial study, 33 subjects evaluated
110 behavioral descriptions on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 (unde
sirable behavior) to 9 (desirable behavior). On the basis of this pilot
study, 50 behavioral evaluatively neutral descriptions were selected that
were more or less of the same length (25 to 35 characters). In a second
pilot study, 40 (other) subjects rated these descriptions on stereotypical
ity for members of four social groups: artists, professors, police officers,
and environmental activists. Subjects were asked how likely it is for a
member of a group to perform a particular behavior. Nine-point scales
were used with poles labeled "not at all likely" and "very likely."
Artists (or an artist) were chosen as a target in the first experiment.
Eighteen behavioral descriptions were selected six of which were con
sistent with the stereotype (M = 6.98) and six were inconsistent with the
stereotype (M = 3.09). Furthermore, six filler items were selected (M =
5.05). All items were evaluatively neutral.
Procedure. Subjects participated in the experiment in groups of up to 9
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persons per session. They were placed in individual cubicles containing
an Apple Macintosh computer, which was used to provide all informa
tion concerning the experiment. They were asked to read a series of
behavioral descriptions about members of a group (or about a single
individual) at their own pace and to form an impression of this group
(or individual). In the group condition, descriptions were accompanied
by (male) first names. In the person condition, all descriptions were
accompanied by the name "Bart." In all conditions, the first two items as
well as the last two items to appear on the screen were fillers (i.e.,
stereotype-neutral behaviors). All other itemswere presented in random
order. In the stereotype afterwards condition subjects were informed, on
the first screen after the presentation of the behavioral descriptions, that
they had been reading about artists (or an artist). In the no stereotype
activation condition, no such information was provided. After comple
tion of the reading task, subjects were presented with a free recall task.
Subsequently subjects were paid and debriefed.
Dependent Variables. After reading the behavioral statements, subjects
were asked to recall as many behavioral descriptions as possible. They
were given 6 minutes to complete this task.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recall. The number of each type of item recalled was counted for each
subject. Filler items, however, were not included in the analyses because
they were not presented in random order. An item was counted as
correct if the general meaning of the original item was reflected (cf. e.g.,
Gordon & Wyer, 1987; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Srull, 1981, 1983). A 2
(stereotype activation: no stereotype vs. stereotype after encoding) x 2
(target: group vs. individual) between-subjects x 2 (item type: stereo
type-consistent vs. stereotype-inconsistent) within-subjects ANOVA re
vealed a main effect of target. Subjects recalled a higher proportion of
the information when the target was a person (M = .596, excluding fillers)
than when it was a group (M = .519, F (1,67) = 5.19, p < .03). No other
main effects were found.
The only significant interaction obtained was the predicted stereotype
activation x item type interaction (F (1,67) = 4.21, /> < .05, see Table 1).
TABLE 1. Recall of Consistent and Inconsistent Information (Percentages)
Person Group
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
No stereotype 59.8 64.7 52.8 53.7
Stereotype 59.3 54.6 57.4 43.5
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Stereotype activation did not influence the recall of stereotype-consistent
information (F (1,67) = .22, n.s.). It did, however, affect the recall of
stereotype-inconsistent information. As predicted, memory for stereo
type-inconsistent information was worse in the stereotype after condi
tion than in the no stereotype condition (F (1,67) = 4.63, p < .04).
Furthermore, memory for stereotype-consistent information was better
than memory for stereotype-inconsistent information in the stereotype
after condition (F (1,67) = 4.95, p < .03), while there was no difference in
recall of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent items in the
no stereotype condition (F (1,67) = .46, n.s.).
In sum, an a posteriori activated stereotype impairs retrieval of stereo
type-inconsistent information from memory, both under person percep
tion conditions and under group perception conditions. By replicating
earlier findings (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a), with a differ
ent memory measure, the effect appears to be robust.
EXPERIMENT 2
Following from our theoretical argument outlined in the introduction,
the hypothesis to be tested is that recall of stereotype-inconsistent infor
mation is impaired upon a posteriori stereotype activation if it is stored
in a separate trait-behavior cluster not fitting in with the stereotype,
while no differential recall of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-in
consistent information is expected if stereotype-consistent and stereo
type-inconsistent behaviors are stored in the same stereotype-related
trait-behavior cluster.
It may seem confusing that a trait organization explanation is being
advanced while this issue was not addressed in the construction of the
stimulus material of Experiment 1. Frankly, this explanation was not
considered at the time we designed Experiment 1 . In view of our present
theorizing, it may be worthwhile to take another look at the items used
in this experiment. Some of the stereotype-consistent behaviors for
artists were: "often forgets to lock the front door," "sometimes doesn't
do the dishes for a week," and "arranged to be rejected as unfit for the
army." Some of the stereotype-inconsistent items were: "had an A for
math at highschool," "often visits soccer matches," and "goes to church
every Sunday." In retrospect, it seems that some of the stereotype-con
sistent items (e.g., those referring to absent-mindedness, and a noncon
formist attitude) do not bear on the same trait dimensions as the
stereotype-inconsistent items (e.g., pertaining to math ability and sports
interest) but, with some imagination, the stereotype-consistent aversion
against military service and the stereotype-inconsistent religious atti
tude may be construed as bearing on an underlying ethics trait dimen-
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sion. Hence, in terms of underlying memory organization, the stereo
type-consistent behaviors and the stereotype-inconsistent behaviors
may have had some dissociated as well as some common trait implica
tions, the former being theoretically conducive to impaired recall of
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activa
tion, while the latter presumably were not affected by it. The resulting
ambiguity concerning the role of trait organization will be explicitly
addressed in Experiment 2.
The hypothesis that impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent behav
iors depends on memory dissociation from stereotype-consistent behav
iors was tested in Experiment 2. We provided subjects either with
information loaded on the same trait dimension (e.g., intelligent and
stupid behaviors) or with information loaded on different trait dimen
sions (e.g., intelligent and aggressive behaviors). Again, a stereotype is
either activated afterwards or not at all.
In Experiment 2, the recall task is used to measure both recall and
ARC-scores (Roenker, Thompson, & Brown, 1971). ARC-scores may be
used to obtain evidence for differential storage for different item types
in the same versus different traits conditions. It follows from our trait
organization argument that we should obtain higher ARC-scores (i.e.,
stronger clustering) for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsis
tent behaviors under conditions with two separate trait-behavior clusters
than under conditions in which stereotype-consistent and stereotype-in
consistent behaviors are expected to be stored in the same cluster. Note
that the presumed memory organization of stereotype-consistent and
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors in the same or different trait-behavior
clusters is assumed to take place during encoding (although the validity
of this assumption is difficult to verify, see Klein & Loftus, 1990). That
is, we assume that memory organization in terms of one versus two
trait-behavior clusters will not be affected by later stereotype activation
(despite the fact that it may help to explain its effects on retrieval). In a
sense, these ARC scores may be regarded as checks on the trait organi
zation manipulation.
For practical reasons, and because of the comparable results obtained
in Experiment 1 for person perception and group perception, only group
perception is studied in this experiment.
METHOD
Subjects and Design. Ninety-six undergraduate students from the Uni
versity of Nijmegen were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (stereo
type activation: no stereotype activation vs. stereotype activation after
encoding) x 2 (number of trait dimensions in the stimulus material: 1-
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TABLE 2. Stimulus Material (Ratings on Nine-Point Scales)
Intelligent Aggressive
Intelligent items 7.12 4.32
Nonintelligent items 2.98 5.16
Aggressive items 4.41 7.36
Nonaggressive items 5.45 2.72
Fillers 5.06 4.96
stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information loaded
on the same trait dimension vs. 2- stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent information loaded on different dimensions) x 2 (target:
professors vs. hooligans) x 2 (stimulus set: the intelligent/nonintelligent
set vs. the aggressive/nonaggressive set in the one-trait conditions and
the intelligent/aggressive set vs. the nonintelligent/ nonaggressive set
in the two-traits conditions) between-subjects design. Item type (stereo
type-consistent vs. stereotype-inconsistent) constituted the within-sub-
jects factor. Subjects received Dfl. 5 for participating.
Pretesting of Stimulus Materials. Thirty-three subjects rated fourteen
social groups on 14 trait dimensions. Nine-point scales were used with
poles labeled "members of this group are not at all . . ." (l)and "members
of this group are very. . ." (9). To control for possible negative-positive
asymmetries (e.g., Ikegami, 1993; Reeder, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston,
1987; Vonk, 1993), two groups were selected with opposite scores. Pro
fessors were perceived as intelligent (M = 7.79) and as nonaggressive (M
- 2.98) and hooligans were perceived as aggressive (M = 8.75) and as
nonintelligent (M = 1.87). Subsequently, 40 (other) subjects rated 98
behaviors on intelligence and aggressiveness. Nine-point scales were
used with poles labeled "performing this behavior is not at all . . ." (1)
and "performing this behavior is very . . ." (9) (e.g., intelligent). Thirty
behaviors were selected of which 6 were intelligent, 6 were nonintelli
gent, 6 were aggressive, 6 were nonaggressive and 6 were neutral.
Behaviors that loaded on one trait dimension were neutral with respect
to the other trait dimension (see Table 2 for means).
Four stimulus sets were constructed with 6 stereotype-consistent de
scriptions, 6 stereotype-inconsistent descriptions and (for all sets the
same) 6 filler items (i.e., stereotype-neutral items). In two sets, stereo
type-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors had implications
for the same trait dimension (either intelligent and nonintelligent behav
iors, or aggressive and nonaggressive behaviors). In the two remaining
sets, stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent behaviors loaded
on different dimensions (intelligent and aggressive behaviors, nonintel
ligent and nonaggressive behaviors). The resulting design, then, is a 2
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TABLE 3. Recall of Consistent and Inconsistent Information (Percentages)
1 trait 2tiraits
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
No stereotype
Stereotype
50.0 47.9
50.7 50.7
54.8
55.1
55.6
34.8
(stereotype activation) x 2 (target) x 2 (number of traits) x 2 (stimulus
set) between-subjects design, with a 2 (item type) level factor as within-
subjects factor.
Procedure. The reading task and the stereotype activationmanipulation
were administered in the same way as in Experiment 1. The first two
behaviors as well as the last two behaviors to appear on the screen were
fillers. All other behaviors were presented in random order. After read
ing the behavioral descriptions (and, in the stereotype afterwards con
dition, the introduction of the group label), subjects were presented with
a free recall task. At the end, subjects were paid and debriefed.
Dependent Variables. The free recall task was conducted in the same
way as in Experiment 1. It was now also used to calculate ARC-scores.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recall. The number of correctly recalled stereotype-consistent and stereo
type-inconsistent descriptions were counted for each subject. Again,
filler items were not included in the analyses because they were not
presented in random order. A 2 (Stereotype activation) x 2 (Number of
traits in the stimulus material) x 2 (Target: professors vs. hooligans) x 2
(Stimulus set: the intelligent/nonintelligent set vs. the aggres-
sive/nonaggressive set in the one-trait conditions and the intelligent/ag
gressive set vs. the nonintelligent/nonaggressive set in the two-traits
conditions) between-subjects x 2 (item type) within-subjects ANOVA
revealed a stereotype activation x number of traits x item type interaction
(F (1,80) = 4.54, p < .04, see Table 3 for means). No other effects were
obtained.
Simple two-way interactions revealed that in the no stereotype control
condition and the a posteriori stereotype activation condition there was
no differential recall for stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsis
tent information when they loaded on the same trait dimension (F (1,80)
= .09, n.s.), while there was a differential recall effect of stereotype
activation under conditions with different trait dimensions (F (1,80) =
10.98, p < .002). Under conditions with different trait dimensions, mem
ory for stereotype-inconsistent information was worse when a stereo
type was activated after encoding compared to the no stereotype control
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condition (F (1,80) = 16.48, p < .001), while there was no effect at all of
stereotype activation on stereotype-consistent behaviors (F < 1). In other
words, reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information due to a
posteriori stereotype activation only occurred when it was stored in a
separate trait-behavior cluster. Furthermore, in the stereotype-after
wards condition, memory for stereotype-inconsistent information was
worse than memory for stereotype-consistent information under condi
tions with separate trait-behavior clusters (F (1,80) = 17.11, p < .001),
while there was no recall difference in the no stereotype control condi
tion (F < 1).
ARC-Scores. Behaviors that are stored under the same trait-behavior
cluster are likely to be reproduced in free recall consecutively (i.e., in
strings of two or more) above chance expectation. The extent to which
such clustering occurs is indicated by ARC-scores (Roenker et al., 1971).
In conditions in which the information is stored in two separate clusters,
one would therefore expect ARC-scores for stereotype-consistent and
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors to be higher compared to these ARC-
scores in conditions in which all behaviors are stored in one single
cluster.
Two ARC-scores were computed, one representing the clustering of
stereotype-consistent behaviors, the other representing the clustering of
stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. These two ARC-scores were sub
jected to a 2 (Stereotype activation) x 2 (Number of traits in the stimulus
material) x 2 (Target) x 2 (Stimulus set) between-subjects x 2 (ARC-
scores) within-subjects ANOVA. The only effect obtained was a main
effect of number of traits. In agreement with the intended memory
organization, it was found that clustering was higher in conditions in
which stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information
had implications for different trait dimensions (ARCcon = .22 and AR-
Cinc = .19) than in conditions in which stereotype-consistent and stereo
type-inconsistent information had implications for the same trait
dimension (ARCcon = .13 and ARCinc = .13; F (1,80) = 5.22, p < .03).
In our guided retrieval explanation, the occurrence of deteriorated
recall of stereotype-inconsistent information as a result of a posteriori
stereotype activation depends on its separate trait-cluster organization
inmemory. That is, a stereotype afterwards should bring about impaired
recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors to the extent that these are
stored in a separate trait-behavior cluster. One piece of evidence sustain
ing this argument is provided by the above reported higher ARC scores
in the two-traits versus one-trait condition. In addition, one might on the
basis of the same argument expect the recall of stereotype-inconsistent
behaviors in the two traits/fl posteriori stereotype condition to be in
versely related to the clustering of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors in
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a separate trait. In agreement with our argument, we indeed found a
substantial and significant negative correlation between the ARC-index
for inconsistent information and the recall of this information in this
condition (r = -.59, n = 24, p < .004).
Considering the evidence provided in Experiment 2, the conclusion
seems warranted that deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent be
haviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation is contingent upon their
storage in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait-behavior cluster. In
other words, if memory storage of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors is
dissociated from the storage of stereotype-consistent behaviors, the
afterwards induced stereotype leads to their reduced recall. The question
addressed in the next experiment is whether deteriorated recall of stereo
type-inconsistent information results from an intentional and strategic
search for stereotype-consistent information, or from an involuntary,
perhaps even unconscious, enhanced activation of stereotype-consistent
traits and, potentially, also an involuntary de-activation of stereotype-
inconsistent traits.
EXPERIMENT 3
One general approach towards explaining reduced recall of stereotype-
inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereotype activation is based
on the assumption that subjects more or less deliberately make use of
their knowledge of what the stimulus group is (said to be) like. Memory
search may, for instance, take on confirmatory properties (see, e.g.,
Snyder and colleagues [Snyder, 1981; Snyder & Swann, 1978] for a
related argument in the domain of external information search). That is,
subjects may search their memory for behaviors that fit in with traits
stereotypically attributed to the group. They may think, for example,
"Ah, these are hooligans. They must be aggressive. Right, I remember
some aggressive behaviors." The stereotype may also incite subjects to
disregard stereotype-inconsistent information, even if they do remem
ber having seen such behaviors. "Explaining quantum theory? Hooli
gans? No way!"
Another, also strategic and deliberate, account would be to assume the
operation of demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). Experiment 1 and 2
confront subjects with a curious string of events, which may well make
them wonder what on earth the experimenter is up to. "A professor
wrecking a telephone booth? I think I'm not suppossed to write that
down."
Obviously, there is one major flaw in this strategy-based account. It
fails to explain the pivotal role of associated (same trait) versus dissoci-
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ated (separate traits) storage of stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-
consistent information in memory. It is, however, conceivable that when
the stereotype-consistent and the stereotype-inconsistent information
bear on the same trait dimension, the inherent contradictions in the
stimulusmaterial (and possibly the attendant "inconsistency resolution"
attempts, see, e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a;Wyer & Srull,
1989) may have obliterated the strategic handling of the situation, be
cause the cognitive effort invested in understanding these inherent
contradictions may have diverted attention away from other informa
tion provided in the experiment.
Alternatively, the stereotype-guided retrieval process may be quite
unintentional. The activated stereotype of hooligans may simply have
installed the concept of aggressiveness in the subject's mind. Thinking
of aggressiveness may have unintentionally and without any deliber
ate search strategy operating brought some of the just learned aggres
sive behaviors to mind at the expense of accessing stereotype-
inconsistent traits and behaviors. In addition, recall of stereotype-incon
sistent information stored in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait
concept, may also suffer from involuntarily reduced accessibility of
stereotype-inconsistent traits due to a posteriori stereotype activation (cf.
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in press-b).
The operation of intentional search and selection mechanisms de
scribed above would require that subjects see the activated stereotype as
pertaining to the group about which they just have received behavioral
information. In other words, subjects must apply the activated stereo
type to the group for it to affect the recall process intentionally. If,
however, as we argue, the stereotype guides memory search through
unintentional and unconscious processes, deteriorated recall of stereo
type-inconsistent behaviors of group members would still be obtained
even if the a posteriori stereotype activation is brought about by an
"unrelated prime," that is, by priming the stereotype in such a way that
there is is no plausible reason to associate it with the group or the
stimulus behaviors.
In order to obtain evidence for our argument that a posteriori stereo
types impede recall of separately stored stereotype-inconsistent infor
mation via involuntary processes rather than deliberate search strategies
or selective responding, we replicated Experiment 2 with one important
modification. In Experiment 3 the stereotype is activated in an ostensibly
unrelated task (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in press-b; Hig-
gins, Rholes & Jones, 1977; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994;Wyer & Srull,
1986). The stereotype activation procedure was the same as the proce
dure used in experiments conducted by Macrae, Stangor, and Milne
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(1994; see also Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in press-b). Subjects
were asked to think about a soccer-hooligan (or a professor) and to list
the lifestyle and appearance of a typical member of this group. If with
the use of such an unrelated prime we replicate the results of Experiment
2, a strategic explanation of the deteriorated recall phenomenon would
become highly unlikely, while it would strengthen the case for an
explanation in terms of unintentional processes.
METHOD
Subjects and Design. One hundred and twelve undergraduate students
from the University of Nijmegen were randomly assigned to the cells of
a 2 (stereotype activation: no stereotype activation vs. stereotype activa
tion after encoding) x 2 (number of trait dimensions in the stimulus
material: 1- consistent and inconsistent information loaded one the same
trait dimension vs. 2- consistent and inconsistent information loaded on
different dimensions) x 2 (target: professors vs. hooligans) x 2 (stimulus
set: the intelligent/nonintelligent set vs. the aggressive/nonaggressive
set in the one-trait conditions and the intelligent/aggressive set vs. the
nonintelligent/nonaggressive set in the two-traits conditions) between-
subjects design. Item type (stereotype-consistent vs. stereotype-inconsis
tent) serves as within-subjects factor. Subjects received Dfl. 5 for
participating.
Because the stereotype activation procedure may give rise to suspicion
among subjects who may be familiar with deceptions used in social
psychological experimentation, we used only students from other facul
ties and college freshmen (the experiment was conducted in September)
as subjects.
The design, the stimulus materials, and the dependent variables used
are the same as in Experiment 2. As outlined before, the only difference
concerns the stereotype activation procedure.
Stereotype Activation. After subjects read the behavioral descriptions
they were told that a colleague of the experimenter needed some infor
mation to be used in a forthcoming experiment. Under no stereotype
activation conditions subjects were asked to list as many capital cities as
they were able to come up with. Under stereotype activation conditions
subjects were asked to think about a typical soccer-hooligan (or a typical
professor) and to list attributes of his or her lifestyle and appearance. Both
subjects under no stereotype activation conditions and subjects under
stereotype activation conditions were given five minutes to complete this
task. Subsequently, the recall task was introduced. Upon probing in the
debriefing, none of the subjects indicated suspicion as to the real purpose
of the priming task (i.e., they perceived it as an unrelated task).
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TABLE 4. Recall of Consistent and Inconsistent Information (Percentages)
1 trait 2 traits
Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent
No stereotype
Stereotype
49.4 46.7
41.1 42.3
54.0 47.1
46.0 29.3
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recall. The number of correctly recalled stereotype-consistent and
stereotype-inconsistent descriptions were counted for each subject.
Again, filler items were not included in the analyses because they were
not presented in random order. These data were subjected to a 2 (Stereo
type activation) x 2 (Number of traits in the stimulus material) x 2
(Target: professors vs. hooligans) x 2 (Stimulus set: the intelligent/non-
intelligent set vs. the aggressive/nonaggressive set in the one-trait con
ditions and the intelligent/aggressive set vs. the
nonintelligent/nonaggressive set in the two-traits conditions) between-
subjects x 2 (item type) within-subjects ANOVA. First, a main effect for
stereotype activation was found. Subjects recalled more information
under no stereotype conditions than under stereotype activation condi
tions (F (1,96) = 7.13, p < .01). This effect is qualified by the three-way
interaction described below.
The only significant interaction of theoretical interest2 obtained was
the predicted three-way interaction of stereotype activation x number of
traits x item type (F (1,96) = 4.03, p < .05, see Table 4 for means). Simple
interactions revealed that no differential recall was found when stereo
type-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information loaded on the
same trait dimension (F (1,96) = .10, n.s.) and that recall of stereotype
inconsistent information was impaired after an a posteriori activated
stereotype under conditions with different trait dimensions (F (1,96) =
17.00, p < .001). Under conditions with different trait dimensions, mem
ory for stereotype-inconsistent information was worse when a stereo
type was activated after encoding compared to the no stereotype control
condition (F (1,96) = 18.30, p < .001). Furthermore, memory for stereo
type-inconsistent information was worse than memory for stereotype-
2. Except for a three-way Number of traits (one vs two) x Group (professors vs hooligans)
x Item tvpe (stereotype-consistent vs stereotype-inconsistent information) interaction (F
(1, 96) = 7.52, p < 008). Cell means indicate that subjects recalled stereotype-consistent
information with greater ease than stereotype-inconsistent information, except under
one-trait soccer-hooligans conditions. Importantly, the four-way Stereotype activation x
Number of traits x Group x Item type interaction was not significant (F (1,96) = .00, p < 1).
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consistent information under conditions with separate trait-behavior
clusters and an a posterioriActivated stereotype (F(l,96) = 21.30, p < .001).
No other simple main effects were obtained.
ARC-Scores. Again, ARC-scores were calculated to provide evidence
for the presumed memory organization in terms of 1 versus 2 traits. Two
ARC-scores were computed, one representing the clustering of consis
tent behaviors, the other representing the clustering of inconsistent
behaviors. The ARC-scores were subjected to a 2 (Stereotype activation)
x 2 (Number of traits in the stimulus material) x 2 (Target) x 2 (Stimulus
set) between-subjects x 2 (ARC-scores) within-subjects design. Again, a
main effect for number of traits was found, although it failed to reach
significance. In case stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent
information had implications for different trait dimensions, clustering
was higher (ARCcon = .24 and ARCinc = .28) than under conditions
where stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information
had implications for the same trait dimension (ARCcon = .17 and ARCinc
= .20; F (1,96) = 3.15, p < .08).
We expected retrieval loss of stereotype-inconsistent information to
depend on the way in which this information is stored in memory.
Stereotype-inconsistent information stored in a separate trait-behavior
cluster (i.e., dissociated from the stereotype-consistent information)
should be hard to access. Hence, subjects who stored this information
separately should show impaired retrieval of stereotype-inconsistent
behaviors and, therefore, the degree of separate clustering should be
correlated negatively with recall of this information. We calculated the
correlation between the ARC-score for stereotype-inconsistent informa
tion and recall of this information under two-trait stereotype-activation.
Although the correlation failed to reach significance this time, it was
indeed negative (r = -.31, n = 28, p < .13).
The present experiment shows that stereotype activation by means of
an unrelated priming task i.e., a task explicitly and seemingly convinc
ingly (as probes in the debriefing yielded no indications of suspicion)
presented as unrelated to the experiment does lead to deteriorated
recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors stored in a separate trait-be
havior cluster, while recall of stereotype-inconsistent information stored
together with stereotype-consistent behaviors in the same trait-behavior
cluster does not suffer from the primed stereotype. In our view, these
data constitute compelling evidence that the biased retrieval phenome
non described is of an involuntary nature, rather than the result of a
controlled strategic search for stereotype-consistent information or a
deliberate strategy of suppressing inconsistent responses. Except for
some minor deviations, the effects of the unrelated prime in Experiment
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3 parallel those of the a posteriori stereotype activation in Experiment 2,
suggesting that the observed deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsis
tent information observed in Experiment 2 may be ascribed to facilita-
tory and/or inhibitory effects of stereotype activation. Furthermore, as
in Experiment 2, in the two-traits conditions we observed stronger
clustering of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent informa
tion (as indicated by the ARC-scores) than in the one-trait conditions,
underscoring the postulated role of the organization in memory of
behavioral information in terms of trait clusters with regard to the
deteriorated recall phenomenon.
EXPERIMENT 4
In our theoretical account of deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsis
tent information, we have suggested that two co-ordinate processes may
contribute to the observed phenomenon. Namely, facilitated access to
stereotype-consistent traits and inhibited access to stereotype-inconsis
tent traits. Considering the evidence obtained so far, it is not necessary
to posit reduced access to stereotype-inconsistent traits upon stereotype
activation. It may be argued that the search in memory for behavioral
information often starts with stereotype-consistent traits, due to the
strong links between these traits and the stereotype (or the schema, or
person concept; see e.g. Srull, 1981; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Under two-traits
conditions (i.e., separate storage of stereotype-consistent and stereotype-
inconsistent information), then, the enhanced probability that the search
process starts in the stereotype-consistent trait-behavior cluster may
simply explain the reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent information.
That is, the reduced recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors may be
interpreted as a byproduct of the preferential retrieval of information
from the stereotype-consistent cluster.
However, if stereotype activation also reduces access to stereotype-in
consistent traits, the deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent infor
mation will be retained even if there are no stereotype-consistent
behaviors at all presented in the stimulus set. That is, in situations in
which a group about which information is provided is not associated
with any stereotype-consistent trait to begin with, search via stereotype-
consistent traits is fruitless. The recall task would then require subjects
to search for other information, including stereotype-inconsistent infor
mation, unless access to stereotype-inconsistent traits would be impeded
due to the stereotype activation.
In Experiment 4 we provide subjects only with stereotype-inconsistent
and stereotype-neutral information. It may be argued that in such a
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situation a stereotype activated afterwards would not affect recall of
stereotype-inconsistent information any more than it would affect
stereotype-neutral information, unless the activated stereotype sup
presses access to stereotype-inconsistent traits.
The stereotype activation task used in Experiment 4 is the same as in
Experiment 3 for two reasons. First, a replication with this procedure
may demonstrate the robustness of the effect obtained in Experiment 3.
Second, subjects might get suspicious or confused when, after hearing
what the group consisted of, they realize that they have not read one
single behavior consistent with the stereotype. The unrelated stereotype
prime would avoid this confusion.
METHOD
Subjects and Design. Thirty-six undergraduate students from the Uni
versity of Nijmegen were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (stereo
type activation: no stereotype activation vs. stereotype activation after
encoding) x 2 (target: soccer-hooligans vs. professors) x 2 (stimulus set:
intelligent vs. nonaggressive behaviors for soccer-hooligans and aggres
sive vs. nonintelligent behaviors for professors) between-subjects de
sign. Subjects received Dfl. 5 for participating. Only freshmen and
students from outside the Psychology faculty were allowed to partici
pate. Again debriefing indicated that the stereotype activation task was
perceived as a distinct task.
Except for the stimulus material, the experiment is a replication of
Experiment 3.
Stimulus Materials. Subjects were provided with 18 behavioral de
scriptions. Six of them were inconsistent with the stereotype, the re
maining 12 were fillers. Subjects in the stereotype activation condition
were either provided with the stereotype of a soccer-hooligan or with
the stereotype of a professor. In case the stereotype of soccer-hooligans
was activated, subjects received either a set with 6 nonaggressive be
haviors or with 6 intelligent behaviors. Subjects for whom the stereo
type of professors was activated either received 6 aggressive behaviors
or 6 nonintelligent behaviors. In the no stereotype control condition
subjectswere requested to list capital cities. The stimulus sets presented
in these control conditions matched those used in the stereotype acti
vation conditions. All subjects were provided with the same filler items.
Six filler items were identical to those used in Experiments 2 and 3. The
remaining six items were selected form the pilot-study described in the
Method section of Experiment 2. These items were neutral with respect
to aggressiveness (M = 4.78) and with respect to intelligence (M = 5.18).
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TABLE 5. Recall of Inconsistent Information and Filler Items
(Percentages)
Inconsistent Fillers
No stereotype 50.5 46.1
Stereotype 3L5 42.3
In this experiment, all items, including the filler items, were presented
in random order.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recall. Correctly recalled stereotype-inconsistent items and stereo
type-neutral items were counted for each subject. A 2 (Stereotype acti
vation) x 2 (Target: professors vs. hooligans) x 2 (Stimulus set: the
intelligent set vs. the nonaggressive set in the "soccer-hooligan condi
tion" and the aggressive set vs. the nonintelligent set in the "professor
condition") between-subjects x 2 (item type: stereotype-inconsistent vs.
stereotype-neutral) within-subjects ANOVA was performed with pro
portion recalled as dependent variable. Again, a main effect of stereotype
activation was found. Overall recall was poorer when a stereotype was
activated than when it was not activated (F (1,32) = 6.71, p .02). The
significant two-way interaction of stereotype activation x item type
qualifies this main effect, as predicted (F (1,32) = 4.25, p < .05, see Table
5 formeans). Recall of stereotype-inconsistent information suffered from
an activated stereotype (F (1,32) = 8.62, p .01), while recall of the
stereotype-neutral items did not (F (1,32) = .60, n.s.).
These results suggest that behavioral information that is inconsistent
with a later activated stereotype is more difficult to retrieve from mem
ory than stereotype-neutral behavioral information in the filler items (the
latter having no shared trait implications with the stereotype-inconsis
tent information as shown in the reported pilot study results). As the
present results demonstrate that impaired recall of stereotype-inconsis
tent information is obtained even in the absence of any stereotype-con
sistent information, it may be argued that the impeded recall of
stereotype-inconsistent information observed in Experiments 2 and 3
may, at least partly, have been due to impaired access to stereotype-in
consistent traits due to stereotype activation rather than (exclusively) to
preferential search for stereotype-consistent information. The present
results further demonstrate that, as in Experiment 3, stereotype activa
tion by means of a priming task ostensibly unrelated to the behavioral
information presented earlier does reduce access to stereotype-inconsis-
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tent behaviors, suggesting that the inhibition phenomenon studied is of
an involuntary nature.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments show that stereotype activation leads to dete
riorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. Results establishing
this phenomenon were obtained across four experiments in which three
different target groups (artists, professors, and soccer-hooligans) were
studied. In a previous study (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a)
comparable results were obtained for two different target groups (envi
ronmental activists and professional soldiers). Moreover, impaired
memory for stereotype-inconsistent behaviors due to a posteriori stereo
type activation was demonstrated in a recognition paradigm
(Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995a) as well as in a free recall
paradigm. Considering these findings the impaired memory phenome
non seems to be robust.
In Experiment 2 a theoretical explanation in terms of trait-behavior
clusters was tested. On the basis of person memory research (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in press-a; Hamilton, Driscoll & Worth,
1989), it was argued that if stereotype-consistent and stereotype-incon
sistent behaviors have implications for different trait dimension (e.g.,
aggressive and intelligent behaviors), these behaviors are stored under
different trait-behavior clusters, while stereotype-consistent and stereo
type-inconsistent behaviors having implications for the same trait (e.g.,
aggressive and nonaggressive behaviors) are stored under the same
trait-behavior cluster. It was further argued that a later activated stero-
type would deteriorate recall of stereotype-inconsistent information
only when itwas stored in a separate trait-behavior cluster which as such
was inconsistent with the activated stereotype.
In agreement with this line of argument, the results of Experiment 2
show that impeded recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors only oc
curred when they had implications for a different trait than the stereo
type-consistent behaviors (as suggested by the results of a pilot study),
and not when they had implications for the same trait as the stereotype-
consistent behaviors. The presumed underlying differential memory or
ganization of stereotype-inconsistent and stereotype-consistent
information in terms of separate traits versus the same trait was further
corroborated by ARC-data (i.e., stronger clustering of stereotype-incon
sistent and stereotype-consistent behavioral information, respectively, in
the separate traits conditions). In addition, the obtained negative correla
tion between the ARC-score for stereotype-inconsistent behaviors and
THE PRESERVATION OF STEREOTYPES 47
recall of this information under two-trait stereotype activation conditions
provided further support for the idea that separate clustering in a stereo
type-inconsistent trait underlies impaired recall of stereotype-inconsis
tent information.
Our guided search interpretation of the observed decreased recall of
separately stored stereotype-inconsistent information is that the a poste
riori activated stereotype involuntarily directs memory search in the
direction of stereotype-consistent information and away from stereo
type-inconsistent information, probably without people's awareness of
the influence of the stereotype on retrieval. Alternatively, one could
ascribe the observed decreased recall to an intentional retrieval or re
sponse strategy aimed at recalling and reproducing stereotype-consis
tent behaviors, possibly even accompanied bv a strategic suppression of
stereotype-inconsistent responses.
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate the idea that stereotype-bi
ased retrieval results from involuntary and unconscious cognitive proc
esses, rather than from strategic memory search and selective response
editing. After the presentation of the stimulus material, subjects were
requested to help out another experimenter. They received either a filler
task or were asked to think about "professors" (or "soccer-hooligans")
and list features of their lifestyle and appearance. This manipulation,
ostensibly unrelated to the experiment and, therefore, unlikely to elicit
deliberate retrieval or response strategies, yielded the same pattern of
results as the no versus afterwards stereotype activation manipulation
of Experiment 2. It may therefore be concluded that the obtained im
paired recall of separately stored stereotype-inconsistent behavioral
informationwas due to an involuntary process instead of being the result
of an intentional search strategy. Again, as in Experiment 2, the ARC-
scores indicated separate clustering in the two-traits condition, under
scoring our explanation in terms of the underlying trait organization.
The possibility that the mere prevalence of the involuntary search for
stereotype-consistent information and subsequent reproduction of such
information simply detracts from retrieving stereotype-inconsistent be
haviors organized in a separate stereotype-inconsistent trait cluster
(rather than the latter being difficult to access) was investigated in
Experiment 4. This experiment was identical to Experiment 3, except that
all stereotype-consistent behaviors were replaced by additional stereo
type-neutral items. It appeared that a posteriori stereotype activation
resulted in decreased recall of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors (both
compared to the no stereotype control condition and compared to the
recall of stereotype-neutral behaviors). As there were no stereotype-con
sistent behaviors to retrieve, it seems unlikely that the decreased recall
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of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors may be ascribed to a consistency
prevalence in the retrieval of behaviors. It therefore seems plausible that
stereotype activation essentially makes it more difficult to access behav
iors organized in a stereotype-inconsistent trait (see Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg, in press-b, for converging evidence).
Our present explanation of deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsis
tent information due to a posteriori stereotype activation may have some
important theoretical implications. Since the investigated phenomenon
appears to be robust, models describing memory for social information
mav need to be extended. The associative network model proposed by
Srull and Wyer (1989) explains memory for behavioral information with
the help of associations among behaviors, traits and stereotypes (or
person concepts). They argue that the activation of a stereotype may
strengthen associations between stereotype-consistent trait-behavior
clusters and the "central person concept" or the stereotype. The prob
ability of recall of items from memory is explained in terms of the relative
strength of the associations of these items with other bits of information.
Stereotype activation may enhance the strength of associations of stereo
type-consistent information with the concept.3 Such a model could
account for impaired recall of stereotype-inconsistent information (or
ganized in a stereotype-inconsistent trait) only by predicting a relative
decrease of the strength of associations of stereotype-inconsistent infor
mation as a result of the relative increase of the accessibility of stereotype-
consistent information, because the latter would lower the probability of
retrieving stereotype-inconsistent information. However, considering
the results of Experiment 4, this explanation seems somewhat implausi
ble. First, deteriorated recall of stereotype-inconsistent information was
also obtained when there was no stereotype-consistent information pre
sent in the stimulus information. Second, recall of stereotype-inconsis
tent information suffered from afterwards stereotype activation, while
stereotype-neutral information did not.
The above argument suggests that, in order to account for impaired
retrieval of stereotype-inconsistent information, models of social mem
ory should incorporate mechanisms accounting for suppressed (or in
hibited) access to stereotype-inconsistent traits. For this purpose, one
might think of extending associative network models by introducing
negative associations (e.g., of the type "hooligans are not intelligent") as,
for instance, proposed in the spreading activation model (see e.g., Collins
& Loftus, 1975; see, for a more extensive discussion of this issue, Blair &
Banaji, 1995; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in press-b). Such extended
3. In this case, concept stands for the group or person with which the behavioral
information was originally associated.
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or modified models might be capable of describing and predicting
impaired access to stereotype-inconsistent information by postulating
the active dissociation of trait and concept through a posteriori stereotype
activation.
Apart from the significance of biased retrieval with respect to associa
tive network models (Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1989; Hastie, 1980;
Srull & Wyer, 1989), our research may have more general implications
for research on impression formation and stereotyping. Recently, the
emphasis in this line of research shifted towards conditions of stereotype
use (e.g. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and, although this idea is
not new (Allport, 1954; Lippman, 1922), towards the function of stereo
types as simplifying structures (e.g., Bargh, 1989; Devine, 1989;
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1995b, in press-b; Dovidio, Evans &
Tyler, 1986; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Fox, 1992; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991;
Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths,
1993; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Macrae, Stangor, & Milne,
1994; Medin, 1988; Stangor & Duan, 1991). In most of this research and
theorizing, the focus is basically on the influence of stereotypes on the
increased accessibility and use of stereotype-consistent information.
That is, the core concept in most research is consistency (or congruency,
or stereotypicality). Although this may enhance our knowledge of the
function of stereotypes and the circumstances under which stereotypes
are used, it may be argued that studying the conditions under which
stereotypes impede access to counterstereotypic information can add
considerably to our understanding of stereotypes as well. Stereotypes
may operate as knives that cut both ways, not only facilitating access to
information fitting in with a stereotype, but also obstructing access to
information that conflicts with it (cf. Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, in
press-b).
Considering the present theoretical ideas and empirical results, it is
tempting to speculate on the significance of facilitatory and inhibitory
effects of stereotype activation for memory and, indeed, for social per
ception. In a sense, our guided search explanation of a posteriori stereo
type effects can be understood as a more elaborate account of the nature
of the memory "reconstruction" process as Snyder called it (cf. Snyder
& Uranowitz, 1978; Snyder, 1981). Stereotypes here conceived of as
mental representations of social groups may serve to understand "so
cial reality" both by providing the perceiver with knowledge of what a
group is like, and with knowledge of what a group is not like. Under
standing social reality may simultaneously require the activation of
appropriate knowledge and the suppression of inappropriate, or com
peting, knowledge (cf. Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991). Facilitation of access
to stereotype-consistent information and inhibition of access to stereo-
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type-inconsistent information may, as two sides of coin, complementar-
ily contribute to stereotype stability and persistence.
Since many judgments we make about persons and groups are based
on available information in memory (see Hastie & Park, 1986), biased
retrieval may explain why memory-based judgments are biased in a
stereotypicalmanner and, as a result,why stereotypes are hard to change
(see e.g., Kunda & Oleson, 1995). Suppose we see a woman in a restau
rant giving an outrageous tip and we come to the conclusion that she is
far from stingy. Then, she says to the waiter that the meal, raw herring
in cream, was delicious and her accent betrays that she is Dutch. Theo
retically, this would make it difficult to remember her giving the tip, and,
as a consequence, the Dutch may still be perceived as a bunch of misers.
In sum, a stereotype may protect itself by suppressing the retrieval of
counterstereotypic information.
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